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Competitive bidding (as auctions) is commonly used to procure goods and services. 
Public buyers are often mandated by law to adopt competitive procedures to ensure 
transparency and promote full competition. Recent theoretical literature, however, 
suggests that open competition can perform poorly in allocating complex projects. In 
exploring the determinants of suppliers’ bidding behavior in procurement auctions for 
complex IT services, we find results that are consistent with theory. We find that price 
and quality do not exhibit the classical tradeoff one would expect: quite surprisingly, 
high quality is associated to low prices. Furthermore, while quality is mainly driven by 
suppliers’ experience, price is affected more by the scoring rule and by the level of 
expected competition. These results might suggest that (scoring) auctions fail to 
appropriately incorporate buyers’ complex price/quality preferences in the tender 
design. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Contracting  authorities  often  use  competitive  bidding
1  to  select  providers  of  IT 
services. Competitive bidding was already popular among private procurers, and today 
is a central principle for public procurement regulations worldwide (in particular in 
Europe  and  in  the  U.S.).
2  Competition  in  fact  allows  buyers  to  achieve  cost 
minimization and to ensure transparency.  
When projects are complex, however, economic theory suggests that competition may 
not be the best allocation mechanism. Goldberg (1977) argued that using auctions for 
complex transactions may prevent the parties to exchange important pre-contractual 
information.  More  recently,  Manelli  and  Vincent  (1995)  show  that  bargaining 
dominates competition when the buyer is unsure about the quality the supplier will 
deliver  (quality  is  unobservable).  Empirical  evidence  on  construction  procurement 
highlights the potential limits of sealed-bidding. These stem from unexploited useful 
communication between buyer and supplier (Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis, 2006) and 
to  the  difficulties  in  capturing  post-contract  adaptation  costs  (Bajari  and  Tadelis, 
2001).
3  
The critical point for the buyer in designing competitive bidding for complex projects 
is to precisely describe (many) quality dimensions that are often unverifiable and that 
can sometimes be only partially known at the bidding stage. Talks with practitioners, 
for instance, suggest that the outcome of an new software for a large organization (e.g., 
payroll management) typically depends on the ability of the project managers to set up 
a “working and flexible team” and that of single developers/programmers to transform 
the buyer’s requirements in a good software. Although ability may be inferred by some 
measure of quality (e.g., errors during running) the real functioning of the software can 
be learnt only at the end of the job, when it is rather costly to recover development 
mistakes. 
 
                                                 
1 The open procedure is one of the procedures provided for by EU Directive 18/2004. Other procedure 
are the “negotiated procedure” and the “restricted procedure”. 
2 See the EU Directive 2004/18 and the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 2005. The FAR 2005 (Part 
6) explicitly recommends to adopt full and open competition, with certain limited exceptions. 
3  Although  the  topic  of  the  paper  is  contract  design,  both  economic  and  construction  management 
literature  suggest  a  strong  link  between  cost  reimbursement  contracts  and  the  use  of  negotiations, 
whereas fixed price contracts seem to be awarded by competitive bidding. The link is also present in the 
U.S. FAR.   3 
The task of course becomes even more complicated when the buyer adopts a scoring 
auction to award the contract.
4 Scoring auctions are rather common in the practice of 
public procurement and their use is supported by many procurement regulations. The 
scoring auction is particularly appropriate for commercial/standardized items (as PC 
and  printers),  i.e.,  when  quality  is  verifiable  and  thus  the  buyer’s  price/quality 
preferences  can  be  well  represented  by  a  scoring  rule  (see  Che,  1993).
5  Scoring 
auctions instead do not appear suitable for complex projects, as they “force” the buyer 
to give a precise shape (the scoring rule) to complex, often unknown, price/quality 
preferences.
6  In  these  cases,  problems  may  also  arise  for  suppliers  in  setting  their 
bidding strategies. When competing to provide a commercial item, any supplier easily 
computes  the  monetary  cost  of  improving  his  score  on  the  basis  of  his  internal 
cost/efficiency. In bidding for the provision of a laptop, for instance, if increasing the 
score of 1 point implies lowering price of $500 or, alternatively, offering X additional 
power (e.g. RAM) at the cost of $400, the supplier will for sure opt for the latter to 
save  $100.
7  In  the  case  of  complex,  custom  tailored  projects  (such  as  IT 
solutions/services to be provided to a large buyer) it is not clear how this trade-off, at 
least at the margin, could work. For instance, a reliable cost estimate of developing 
new SW applications requires the supplier to know ex-ante the types and number of 
functionalities  (complexity  of  SW)  and  what  are  existing  IT  infrastructures  (e.g., 
servers) new applications must be compatible with. Lacking precise information, it is 
of course hard for the supplier to estimate how many  consultants (money) will be 
necessary to develop the SW, and thus how the price bid could be traded-off with 
quality dimensions (e.g., completion time, days of ex-post training  for users, more 
advanced programming languages or developing technologies). 
                                                 
4 In public procurement, scoring auctions are known as the awarding criteria of the most economically 
advantageous tender (MEAT). 
5 The rule assesses whether one proposal’s technical superiority is worth the higher price, and it allows 
the buyer to select the best “value for money” supplier (highest score supplier). 
6 Following this point, Che (forthcoming) discusses the issue of non-contractible quality and possible 
solutions,  as  option  contracts  and  reputation  mechanisms.  Also  notice  that  the  recent  theoretical 
developments  produced  by  Asker  and  Cantillon  (2008)  on  the  properties  of  scoring  auctions  pass 
inevitably through the assumption of perfectly verifiable (and thus contractible) quality. 
7 This is true when the scoring rules governing the price/quality tension have certain properties (e.g., 
linearity in the price dimension). Dini, Pacini and Valletti (2006) analyze in more detail the properties of 
linear and non-linear scoring rules.   4 
In Italy, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) selects IT services contractors 
through scoring auctions. Consip
8 acts in the behalf of the MEF, being in charge to 
organize the tenders and to award the contracts. IT services contracts are often “general 
purpose”, or “framework contracts”, i.e., include a large variety of activities – from 
simple  maintenance  to  developments  of  new  applications,  from  IT  consultancy  to 
integration of complex systems. Quality proposals consist in providing effective and 
flexible teams of professionals and technological solutions to best fit the various needs 
of the MEF. The selected supplier is required to adapt its initial organizational set-up 
to  development  tasks  that  will  be  more  clearly  specified  during  the  procurement 
relationship. 
In this paper we aim at moving one first step in understanding suppliers’ behavior in 
bidding for complex projects. The general issue we address is what happens when 
competitive mechanisms are used in settings for which the theory suggests that other 
mechanisms  (e.g.,  negotiation)  could  be  preferable.  More  precisely,  our  research 
questions  are:  can  observed  bids  tell  us  something  about  how  well  the  awarding 
mechanism captures the buyer’s price/quality trade-offs in complex projects? Is there a 
relationship  between  price  and  quality  emerging  from  bids?  What  are  the  most 
important factors explaining bidding behavior, i.e., submitted price/quality ratios? How 
do bidders respond to the incentives generated by different scoring rules? 
To answer these questions we exploit a unique dataset of contracts for IT development 
and  consultancy  that  Consip  (the  Italian  Public  Procurement  Agency)  awarded  on 
behalf of the MEF. In particular, we use the complete set of 20 contracts awarded by 
Consip in the period 1999–2007 in the sector of IT development and consultancy. 
We  find  no  evidence  of  a  tension  between  price  and  quality  in  submitted 
price/technical bids: data exhibit a puzzling negative correlation between quality and 
price bids, such that higher quality is associated to lower prices. These results put at 
least  some  doubts  on  the  possibility  for  scoring  auctions  to  appropriate  capture 
complex price/quality trade-offs. 
Regression analysis also shows that the nature of the scoring rule and past experience 
are important determinants of submitted quality/price ratios. However, while quality is 
mainly driven by suppliers’ experience, price is influenced by the scoring rule and by 
                                                 
8 Since 1997 Consip S.p.A. (the Italian Public Procurement Agency) is mandated to select suppliers and 
manage IT contracts on behalf of the MEF.    5 
the level of expected competition. This provides some support to the conjecture that 
quality and price bidding may respond to rather different elements. 
Finally, we find that the distribution of scores for technical proposals is significantly 
less dispersed when evaluation committees are composed of “outsiders” (mainly non-
IT  persons)  rather  than  “insiders”,  suggesting  that  in  the  former  case  competition 
shifted more towards the economic aspect of the contract. Results offer several insights 
for policy considerations on IT services scoring auction design. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the related empirical 
literature.  Section  3  describes  the  procurement  environment,  the  characteristics  of 
contracts and the role of Consip and the MEF. It also provides a description of the 
dataset  and  some  basic  descriptive  statistics.  Section  4  illustrates  the  results  from 
regression  analysis  testing  for  price/quality  trade-off  in  observed  bids.  Section  5 
explores the determinants of price/quality ratios, while section 6 investigates the role 
of committees in explaining the variability of technical scores. Section 7 concludes the 
paper and summarizes some policy indications. 
 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
This paper is related to the empirical literature on bidding in procurement auctions. 
Important results have been achieved in the field of structural approach to auctions. 
Several authors estimated structural auction models addressing the issue of common 
value  vs.  private  value  (e.g.  Athey,  Susan  and  Haile  2006,  Paarsch  1992,  Guerre, 
Perrigne and Vuong 2000), often finalized to find evidence of the winner’s curse in 
both one dimensional and multidimensional procurement auctions (Hong and Shum 
2002). This field of research exploits repeated auctions data (e.g., timber auctions), and 
relies on frameworks where bidders’ behavior can be well enough incorporated in a 
structural  model.  A  structural  approach  allows  the  researcher  to  identify  the 
distribution of bidders’  values and thus to investigate important issues  such as the 
optimality of reserve prices or the mark ups realized by bidders. 
The cross-section nature of our data, as well as the complexity of the environment 
prevent  the  use  of  structural  approach  and  suggest  the  adoption  of  reduced  form 
models. In their recent paper, Asker and Cantillon (2008) highlight serious difficulties    6 
from  the  standpoint  of  identification
9  that  in  our  settings  would  be  even  more 
complicated as observed scores do not reflect precise quality/technical characteristics – 
verifiable  quality  is  one  key  assumption  in  their  model  –  rather  they  arise  from 
discretional evaluation of projects (unverifiable quality).  
However, the nature of data allows us to address issues that others have not yet been 
able to address. To some extent these issues are closer to the ones investigated by the 
literature on the bidding behavior for complex/incomplete contracts. There are several 
papers exploring renegotiation and adaptation costs – most of them bounded to the 
field of public works and construction industry. For instance, Bajari, Houghton and 
Tadelis  (2007)  and  Bajari  and  Tadelis  (2001)  try  to  measure  such  costs  in  the 
procurement of highways paving works in the U.S.. The limitations to use auctions, 
when  projects  are  complex  and  contractual  design  is  incomplete,  suggest  that 
negotiations may be more attractive than auctions. By the way, Bajari, McMillan and 
Tadelis (2008) compare auctions with negotiations by examining a comprehensive data 
set of private sector building contracts in the U.S.. Crocker and Reynolds (1993) use 
Air  Force  engine  procurement  contracts  to  show  how  the  degree  of  observed 
contractual completeness reflects the desire of the parties to minimize the economic 
costs associated with ex-post contractual exchange. Several other papers have studied 
bidding for construction and highway contracts (e.g., Porter and Zona 1993) with the 
goal to isolate transaction costs due to ex-post renegotiation. 
Our perception is that there is a lack (of valuable data and hence) of understanding of 
several other important issues in procurement. While theoretical works advanced the 
research on the properties of multidimensional procurements (Dagupta and Spulberg 
1989, Che 1993, Branko 1997, Asker and Cantillon 2008), and studied the conditions 
under  which  scoring  auctions  can  do  better  than  other  mechanisms  (Asker  and 
Cantillon  2006),  empirical  investigations  on  the  role  of  scoring  rules  on  bidding 
behavior are completely absent. In particular, how bidders effectively trade-off price 
and quality? What is the role of critical elements of the tender design, such as the 
nature of the scoring rules or bidders’ experience, in the bidding behavior? Attempts to 
investigate the role of competitive tender design and scoring rules on bidders’ behavior 
are in Lundberg (2005), although in a completely different setting. In a framework 
where suppliers bid to supply cleaning services to local public administrations, the 
                                                 
9 For instance, “the observed information (the scores) is one dimensional while the information to be 
inferred is multidimensional” (Asker and Cantillon, 2008, p. 81).   7 
author’s most important result is no evidence of differences in winning bids depending 
on the auction format (simultaneous multiple lots vs. single lots). Zhong (2007) is the 
work most related to ours. The author explores some key issues in online procurement 
auctions for manufacturing goods from a large buyer in the high-tech industry. He 
characterizes the suppliers’ bidding behavior to examine the effect of incumbency on 
bidding. His most interesting findings are: i) the buyer bias towards the incumbent 
suppliers,  the  buyer,  however,  is  not  committed  to  the  final  tender  ranking;  ii) 
incumbent has a price premium; iii) incumbent winners quality is higher, on average, 
than the quality buyer had before the auction, while non-incumbent winner's quality is 
lower; iv) using field data of procurement auctions for legal services, he shows that 
prices are on average reduced after dynamic bidding events. 
 
3. The Institutional context 
 
3.1. What is Consip 
Consip  S.p.A.  is  one  of  the  first  European  Central  purchasing  bodies  to  raise  the 
challenge  of  rationalization  of  public  spending  for  the  procurement  of  goods  and 
services. It was created in 1997 to provide the MEF with ICT solutions, technologies 
and  services,  and  to  promote  IT  change  management  within  its  Departments  and 
peripheral offices. So, one important task of Consip was (and still is) to manage ICT 
acquisitions to maintain the whole IT infrastructure supporting the MEF activities. The 
Italian Financial Law (December 23, 1999 n. 488) laid down the foundations for the 
“Rationalization  Program  for  Public  Spending  on  Goods  and  Services”,  charging 
Consip with the additional task of implementing the program and working as central 
procurement agency for all the public administrations.
7 
A  specific  three-year  based  agreement  regulates  the  afore-mentioned  outsourcing 
relationship.  The  agreement  mandates  Consip  to  perform  several  activities:  from 
demand analysis and identification of key IT solutions to suppliers selection, but also 
contract management and monitoring. With regard to suppliers selection, Consip is 
mandated  to:  define  needs/solutions,  organize  the  tender,  appoint  the  evaluating 
                                                 
7 The program is currently carried out through two main tools: framework contracts and the Italian 
Government’s e-Platform (MEPA), an online e-platform for low-value purchases. Framework contracts 
are stipulated for higher–volume acquisitions from suppliers who are awarded the contract as a result of 
an open competitive procedure. The online marketplace (MEPA), instead, allows public administrations 
to procure low-value items with fast and “slim” procedures (request for quotation and one-stop orders).   8 
committee,  evaluate  the  suppliers’  proposals,  award  and  manage  the  contract  and 
monitor suppliers’ performance. 
Contracts  either  refer  to  specific/small  activities  (e.g.,  development  services  for  a 
single MEF Department or over a specific MEF architecture - “vertical projects”), or to 
larger projects involving many activities merged into a big cross-Departments contract. 
Some  of  the  most  important  contracts  are  of  the  second  type,  that  is  “framework 
contracts”  or  “general  purpose”,  including  a  large  variety  of  activities,  such  as  IT 
consultancy, development and maintenance of IT applications, databases, internet and 
intranet websites. Our dataset is essentially based on these general purpose contracts. 
In compliance with the EU Directive 2004/18 all these contracts are awarded through 
open competitive tendering. The Italian law incorporates the EU rules, establishing the 
most economically  advantageous tender  (MEAT) and the lowest price  as the main 
criteria to award contracts for services. However, IT contracts are usually awarded by 
the MEF with the MEAT. 
Quality is crucial for every IT services contract. Very often the weight of the technical 
side is equal or above 50% and evaluation of proposals is always based on a significant 
discretional component. 
The  “typical”  contract  requires  the  contractor  to  set  up  an  adequate  team  of 
professionals, resources, IT equipments and technological solutions to achieve both 
high quality standards and sufficient flexibility  to manage heterogeneous activities. 
The three milestones of evaluation criteria  are  the organizational proposal (teams), 
technological solutions and improvements over key performance indicators. To each 
milestone is assigned a weight (score/points). Within each single milestone, points are 
allocated to several sub-criteria. Basically, the milestones are: 
·  Organization, e.g., how resources are organized and deployed to best perform 
tasks; solutions to maintain stability and provide flexibility to working teams; 
how  activities  are  split  among  partners  in  case  of  joint  bidding  or 
subcontracting; 
·  Solutions, e.g., software, methodologies and tests for development activities, 
best practices for the implementation of big projects involving many “Function 
Points”;
10 
                                                 
10 Function Points are a software metrics to quantify estimating software development. Function Point 
Analysis is considered a reliable method for measuring the size of computer software. In addition to   9 
·  Quality,  e.g.,  quality  plans,  documents  released,  improvements  over  Key 
Performance Indicators (KPI), skills of professionals and consultants, etc. 
 
Contracts  are  fixed-price,  providing  for  some  performance  incentives  based  on  the 
achievement of certain KPI thresholds. 
As anticipated above, the contracts provide for a large variety of activities, e.g.: 
·  evolutionary and corrective maintenance of applications; 
·  development over existing applications; 
·  development of new applications; 
·  consultancy on IT services and data monitoring; 
·  management of websites (development of new accessible websites, publishing, 
etc.); 
·  management of data warehouse and databases; 
·  help-desk and end-user assistance/support levels; 
·  corporate  assistance/support/consultancy  (Ministry  of  Economy  and  his 
Cabinet). 
 
To  best  manage  all  activities,  contracts  usually  require  the  contractor  to  deploy 
different  types  of  professionals:  the  Chief  of  the  project,  a  list  of  selected  senior 
consultants,  and  teams  composed  of  several  other  professionals,  such  as  junior 
consultants,  function  analysts,  programmers,  product/technology  specialists,  data 
warehouse designers and enterprise data administrators. 
Depending on the size of the contract and the number of departments/users involved, 
supplier’s  team  may  be  composed  of  even  more  than  100  professionals.  The 
contractor’s team operate in harness with dedicated people from the MEF and Consip 
project managers and monitoring unit. 
 
3.2. Bids’ evaluation: role of committees 
Contracts for services are usually awarded with the most economically advantageous 
tender criterion (MEAT). This configures a sealed-bid first score procurement auction. 
Technical and price bids are simultaneously submitted by each supplier. 
                                                                                                                                             
measuring output, Function Point Analysis is useful in estimating projects, measuring productivity, and 
communicating functional requirements.   10 
Submitted bids are evaluated by ad-hoc committees. The committee checks whether 
competing suppliers have the minimum technical/economic requirements indicated in 
the  solicitation  documents.  All  suppliers  fulfilling  the  minimum  requirements  are 
admitted to the subsequent phase. In this phase, the committee evaluates the technical 
bids of all the admitted suppliers. As mentioned before, in the case of IT contracts, the 
technical bid consists in an organizational proposal of teams and resources which are 
(discretionally) evaluated by committee. The committee judges how the organizational 
setting and proposed solutions are able to perform the various activities established in 
the  contract.  At  the  end  of  the  evaluation  process,  the  committee  draws  the  final 
technical scores. These scores are disclosed in a public session with the suppliers. In 
the same public session the committee opens the sealed envelopes containing the price 
bids and publicly announces the submitted prices.
11 
The  committee  only  evaluates  technical  proposals.  Despite  discretion  powers  it  on 
assigning the score within the sub-criteria indicated in section 3.1, the committee is 
committed to the maximum score for each macro-criterion, as well as to the specific 
scoring rule for price bids indicated in the solicitation documents.
12 
Submitted price bids are not known during this evaluation process and are discovered 
by the committee and the bidding suppliers in the same time during the public session. 
After announcing the technical scores and prices, the committee computes the financial 
scores, by inserting the submitted prices in the scoring rule.
13 The total score (and thus 
the final ranking) is computed by summing the technical and the financial scores for 
each supplier. 
The composition of the committees is regulated by the law. Until 2006 the legislation 
established  members  to  be  selected  among  both  public  administration’s  employees 
(“insiders”)  and  external  professionals,  such  as  university  professors  or  recognized 
experts  (“outsiders”).  Since  2007  committees  are  of  all  insiders.  The  number  of 
members can be either 3 or 5 depending on the complexity of the supply.
14 
Our dataset enables us to make some comparisons between the two regimes and to see 
whether,  other  things  being  equal,  there  is  a  difference  in  evaluating  technical 
                                                 
11 In this phase suppliers are able to compute their own total scores and the score of competing suppliers, 
and thus to find out the winner’s identity. 
12 For instance, if the solicitation document provides for up to 5 points for “organization” the committee 
is free to assign between 0 and 5 depending on the quality of the supplier’s proposal over that aspect, but 
is not allowed to assign more than 5 points. This, of course, holds for each technical criterion.  
13 The scoring rule, as well as the score of each technical evaluation criteria, are public information as 
they must be disclosed in the solicitation documents. 
14 The rules on committees apply to Consip as well as to all other public administrations.   11 
proposals.  The  first  contracts  (1999-2002)  and  than  the  latest  ones  (2007)  were 
evaluated by insiders committees, while all the others by mixed committees (insiders 
and outsiders). Our conjecture is that, being in depth with the details of the contract, 
internal committees are likely to evaluate technical proposals with more accuracy than 




4.  Overview of the dataset 
 
Our analysis is based on a unique set of 20 contracts
13 that Consip awarded in the 
period  1998–2007.  The  total  value  of  the  contracts  analyzed  amounts  to  €428,7 
millions, 4,6% of total Italian expenditure on IT services in 2006 (private and public 
sectors amount to €9,3 billions). 
Economic  value  is  only  one  aspect  characterizing  the  importance  of  such  data  of 
contracts. First, we are able to address issues not yet empirically explored. One is the 
impact  of  scoring  rules  on  bidding  behavior.  Second,  these  contracts  are  for 
performing strategic activities, as they often relate to critical (IT) MEF infrastructures, 
such as the ones supporting the Public Balance Sheet and the definition of Budget 
Laws.  Moreover,  despite  the  set  of  20  contracts  yields  a  limited  number  of 
observations, namely 132 price/technical pairs, these are the whole set of procurement 
auctions on IT services run by Consip in behalf of MEF since its creation in 1997. In 
other words, we do not deal with observations “drawn” from a sample of contracts, 
rather with the whole set of existing contracts. 
One  last  element  worth  highlighting  is  the  number  and  the  importance  of  bidding 
suppliers.  Bidders  include  the  major  worldwide  players  in  IT,  such  as  Accenture, 
Almaviva,  Enterprise  Digital  Architects  (EDA),  EDS,  Engineering,  IBM,  Siemens. 
These are the most important suppliers in the IT sector, covering almost the entire 
market share in Italy and Europe, as reported in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Figure 3 reports 
the  number  of  times  these  suppliers  submitted  a  bid  in  the  set  of  contracts  we 
                                                 
13 In some circumstances the competitive tender is split in different lots. Each lot is a different contract 
and  thus  considered  as  separated  competitive  framework.  See  Grimm,  Pacini,  Spagnolo  and  Zanza 
(2006) for an in-depth discussion on lots division and competition in procurement. 
   12 
considered.  As  the  reader  can  note,  the  most  important  IT  services  provision 
companies compete to provide IT services to the MEF. 
 
Figure 1-2 – Revenues from main IT services suppliers operating in Italy (2006) 
 
 
Figure 3 – Overall tender participation from main IT services suppliers operating in Italy. 
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4.1. Some statistics 
Many  issues  analyzed  below  are  widely  discussed  in  the  common  practice  of 
procurement.  However,  even  at  level  of  simple  descriptive  statistics,  there  is  no 
systematic evidence about the direction of the effects that practitioners and economists   13 
have been suggesting by years. For instance, while many procurers are aware about the 
potential adverse effects of large contract value (high reserve price) on participation of 
(especially small) firms, to our knowledge there is no study attempting to test this 
relationship.
15  Similar  considerations  can  be  made  about  contract  value  and  joint 
bidding, as well as the effects of supplier’s experience/learning on the chances to win 
future competitions. 
 
4.1.1 Bids and scores 
The simple ranking of contracts by technical scores
16 raffled off shows that quality is 
very important. We note that 60% of contracts are skewed on technical side. In the 
majority of lots quality weights at least 60%. Contracts in which quality is at least 50% 
are 85% of total contracts. 
 
Table 1 – Frequency distribution of available Technical Score 
a  <50  50-59  60-69  ≥70 
N.  3  5  8  4 
%  0.15  0.25  0.40  0.20 
Table 2 – Frequency distribution of available Financial Score 
b  ≤30  31-40  41-50  >50 
N.  4  8  5  3 
%  0.20  0.40  0.25  0.15 
 
Symmetrically, the frequency distribution of financial scores shows that 60% of lots 
has been faced with scores until 40 points, or 85% under 50 financial score. 
Table 3 and 4 show the frequency distribution of observed relative scores effectively 
achieved by the competitors. Relative score equals actual score/maximum score. The 
cumulated distribution is plotted in Figure 4. The central technical score ranges (51-60 
and  61-70)  represents  the  50%  of  technical  proposals,  whereas  62%  of  technical 
proposals obtained scores over 60. Overall average technical score is 66.17, median is 
65. Standard deviation is 14.67, showing a significant dispersion if we consider the 
                                                 
15  In  the  U.S.,  the  importance  of  the  issue  was  recognized  by  the  creation  of  the  Small  Business 
Administration (SBA, www.sba.gov) already in 1953. The SBA is an independent agency of the Federal 
Government  in  charge  to  provide  support  to  small  business.  The  role  of  SBA  is  critical  in  public 
procurement since it monitors that contracting agencies fulfil the “set-aside” goals provided by FAR 
(2005, Subpart 19.5 — Set-Asides for Small Business). The goal was established to protect small (and 
disadvantaged) business in the market for public procurement contracts. 
16  Henceforth,  we  will  use  score(s)  and  points(s)  interchangeably.  This  holds  also  for  lot(s)  and 
contract(s).   14 
best and the worst technical proposals. But statistics also highlight the low number of 
bidders (9 out of 132) achieving the highest score range (91-100). 
Table 3 – Frequency distribution of relative technical score 
rank  <=40  41-50  51-60  61-70  71-80  81-90  91-100 
N.  5  13  31  36  19  19  9 
%  0.04  0.10  0.23  0.27  0.14  0.14  0.07 
Summary Statistics 
Mean  Median  St. Deviation 





Things are quite different if we analyze the frequency distribution of relative financial 
scores. The first two higher ranks (81-90 and 91-100) together account for the 51% of 
proposals, while the 75% are over 50. Furthermore, both the mean and the standard 
deviation  (72.60  and  25.43  respectively)  are  greater  with  respect  to  the  technical 
scores. This might also be due to a sort of “bias” in the mapping from price to score 
when using “interdependent” scoring (see paragraph 4.1.3 for more details on scoring 
rules). For instance, although one supplier’s bid is slightly above the average, the score 
differential between her bid and the average bid can be very large when using “average 
scoring”.  Anyway, data show clearly that bidders seem to achieve higher ranks of 
financial scores more easily rather than analogous levels of technical scores. 
 



















Rel Tech Score Rel Financial Score
 
Table 4 – Frequency distribution of relative financial score 
rank  <=40  41-50  51-60  61-70  71-80  81-90  91-100 
N.  18  15  8  9  15  24  43 
%  0.14  0.11  0.06  0.07  0.11  0.18  0.33 
Summary Statistics 
Mean  Median  St. Deviation 
72.60  80.81  25.43   15 
 
A noteworthy  finding is that suppliers do not win submitting outstanding financial 
proposals. The score matrix below shows that the winner obtains the highest technical 
score in 16 cases out of 20, whereas only in 7 cases out of 20 she gets the highest 
financial  score.  This  suggests  that  suppliers  mainly  win  contracts  by  promising 
relatively more (ex-ante) quality rather than low price, so much so they win 11 times 
thanks to the best technical score, but not to achieve the best financial ones. 
 
Score Matrix 
Winners’ Technical Score 
  Best score  Not best 
Best 








(a) Participation and contract value
17 
As the contract value increases, the economic and technical requirements become more 
binding for suppliers.
17 This may adversely affects participation of smaller firms and 
encourage joint bidding, as we will see in more detail in the next paragraph. 
We  have  run  a  simple  OLS  estimation  in  order  to  test  for  a  negative  correlation 
between the number of actual bidders and the reserve price/contract value, controlling 
for  some  other  factors  likely  to  affect  participation  (e.g.,  type  of  scoring  rule, 
discretional  technical  scores).  Regression  analysis  confirms  the  intuition:  negative 
relationship  is  statistically  significant  (t-statistic  =  -2.92),  as  well  as  the  negative 








                                                 
17 The contract value is also the reserve price. Therefore, we will use these interchangeably. 
17 Italian public procurement laws and the Antitrust Authority indicate that participation requirements, 
namely revenues and financial capacity, should be proportional  to the contract value. Larger contracts 
require  suppliers  to  satisfy  higher  revenue/financial  capacity  for  bidding  in  that  procurement 
competition.   16 





































Figure  5  shows  that  starting  from  low  values,  an  increase  in  the  reserve  price  is 
associated with lower participation. Instead, above a certain threshold (€40 millions) 
participation  slightly  increases  with  the  reserve  price.  This  could  be  explained  by 
assuming that the participation of the biggest and most experienced suppliers is, to 
some  extent,  “value  independent”.  In  particular,  the  two  outlier  tenders  have  been 
competed by 4 and 5 bidders respectively, 3 and 4 of which are joint bidders including 
the largest and more experienced players of the IT sector (Accenture, Almaviva, EDS, 
IBM, Engineering, Siemens). 
 
(b) Participation and joint bidding 
Partnership is a common form of participation to tenders when contracts are “big”. 
Joint bidding can be an appropriate strategy for small as well as for big firms. The 
latter might be skeptic about bidding autonomously: especially at their first bidding, 
they may prefer sharing risks with other (possibly more expert) bidding firms. The 
former  do  not  always  have  enough  economical/technical  capacity  for  individual 
bidding,  so  participation  necessarily  requires  partnership.  Figure  6-7  support  this 
hypothesis:  joint  participation  is  more  frequent  for  large  contracts  –  indeed,  the 
correlation with the contract value of share of joint bids over the number of bids in 
each lot is relevant and statistically significant. On the other hand, the absolute number 
of joint bids also increases over time, as shown in fig. 6 (tenders are time graded). 
Notice the effect of extreme values in Figure 7. As the contract value increases, the 
                                                 
18 We computed a Locally Weighted Scatter Plot Smoothing with a bandwidth = 0.8.   17 
relationship tends to be less steep since the overall participation becomes lower due to 
more stringent economic requirements and joint participation proportion tends to 1. 
 































actual bidders/lot joint bidding(RTI) Lineare (joint bidding(RTI))
 
 














(c) Awarding rates and participation 
Figure 8 shows the correlation between awarding rates and participation. The number 
of  participations  for  each  supplier  is  the  number  of  contracts  for  which  she  has 
submitted an offer. 
 
 
   18 





















The size of the ball in the graph represents the number of suppliers with a given pair 
participations-wins. On the one hand, we observe that most of the suppliers never won 
a contract: 26 suppliers bid once and were awarded no contract; 15 firms bid twice 
without winning any contract. There are even suppliers facing with 9 bids and still 
facing  with  0  contracts  awarded.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  smaller  number  of 
suppliers  winning  quite  frequently.  The  relationship  between  participations  and 
number of contracts won seems to be exponential. The number of contracts awarded, 
and the probability of winning a contract (number of wins/number of bids) seems to 
increase with the participation. The more frequently any supplier bids, the greater her 
chances to win a contract.
19 
 
Data  show  some  learning  effect.  After  winning  and  supplying  a  contract  bidders 
acquire an informational advantage over potential competitors. Such an advantage is 
then exploited in subsequent tenders, allowing experienced suppliers to become more 
efficient and so increase (more-than proportionally) their probability to win a contract. 
The  regression  analysis  presented  in  Section  5  illustrates  how  experience/learning 
plays  an  effective  role  in  suppliers’  bidding  behavior,  also  when  controlling  for 
important elements of the procurement tender design. 
 
4.3. Scoring rules 
Contracts  for  IT  services  always  contain  various  aspects  of  quality.  Such  a 
multidimensional problem is treated with MEATs. As well known, MEATs are usually 
performed by scoring rules that transform price (and/or other quality aspects) into a 
                                                 
19 The relation between winning and participation is well fitted by a polynomial graph of 2
nd order which 
shows a more than proportional increase in winning with respect to the number of bids submitted.   19 
score. The highest score wins the contract.
20 As a preliminary analysis, Figure 9 shows 
how rebates of winners increase on average when the scoring rule is “linear” with 
respect  to  other  rules.
21  A  scoring  rule  is  said  to  be  linear  if  score  increases 
linearly/proportionally as the price declines. This type of scoring rule belongs to the 
family that we may call independent scoring rules. Independent scoring rules are such 
that one bidder’s score depends on her bid only. Interdependent scoring rules, instead, 
are such that the score of any bidder also depends on some (or all) other bids (e.g. the 
lowest bid, the highest bid, the average bid, etc.). 
We will see below that the former type of rule leads to lower submitted prices on 
average. The difficulty or the impossibility to fully infer the buyer’s preferences in 
terms of price-quality trade-off in the case of interdependent rule may be at the root of 
such  a  difference.  With  linear  scoring  rules,  at  the  contrary,  computing  the  score 
associated to any possible price bid and thus defining the  appropriate  price/quality 
strategy is much more easy for suppliers. Simplicity of the rule and predictability of 
the score might then stimulate price competition, as Figure 9 seem to suggest. 
Interdependent scoring rules tend to yield significant lower rebates on average – about 
27% with respect to 46% – than independent scoring rules.
22 In particular, “lowest 
and/or average price-based” scoring rules induce suppliers to submit bids as close as 
possible to what they expect the best or average price will be. The more precise this 
estimate is, the more chances the supplier will have in achieving an high score. The 
uncertainty, however, may trigger a precautionary or not aggressive bidders’ behavior 




                                                 
20 See Che (1993) and Asker and Cantillon (2008-2006) for theoretical implications and properties of 
scoring auctions. See also Dini, Pacini and Valletti (2006) for an in-depth analysis on the design of 
scoring rules. 
21  “The  linear  scoring  rule  is  a  very  simple  way  to  transform  price  bids  into  a  score.  This  rule  is 
described  by  […]”: 
( )









,  where  the  price  threshold  is  a 
percentage of the reserve price that the procurer may want to introduce in order to stimulate competition 
on price.” See Chapter 12, N. Dimitri, G. Piga, G. Spagnolo (2006), “Handbook of Procurement”, 
Cambridge University Press. 
22 Data also show that price bids tend to be more concentrated under interdependent scoring rules than 
under independent scoring rules. The effects of interdependent scoring rules has not been studied by the 
theoretical literature. However, first indications from Albano et al. (2007) suggest that interdependent 
scoring rules might facilitate some form of coordination among bidders. Lower dispersion found in 
submitted bids when scoring mechanisms are of the interdependent type might not conflict with the 
authors’ findings.   20 
Figure 9 – Rebates of winning bidders and scoring Rules 

























5.  Empirical analysis 
 
In this section we use the dataset to explore the main factors explaining suppliers’ 
bidding behavior. 
Our estimates are based on a non-structural (or reduced form) regression approach. As 
mentioned in the literature section we do not wish – and our data do not allow us – to 
address issues implying the derivation of a structural model, such as the optimality of 
reserve  price,  checking  common  value  vs.  private  value  paradigm,  or  estimating 
suppliers’  mark-up.  Our  environment  does  not  appear  appropriate  for  structural 
modeling.  Buyer’s  and  suppliers’  behavior  would  be  very  hard  to  describe  in 
multidimensional  procurement  environments  where,  among  others,  contracts  are 
highly incomplete, quality is non-contractible and bids are discretionally evaluated by 
the  committee.
23  Optimization  should  also  account  for  several  factors,  often 
unobservable to the econometrician (or observable at prohibitive costs) or hard to be 
modeled. These are for instance the description of a large set of law-driven auctions 
rules,
24 and the multiplicity of buyers’ needs “dispersed” – and often only roughly 
described – in the contract. 
The reduced form approach allows us to focus more on the directions rather than 
magnitude effects. A standard reduced form regression model is the following: 
 
                                                 
23 One issue of our data is that sometimes explanatory variables cannot be considered fully exogenous. 
Endogeneity may affect for instance the scoring rule or the reserve price. Sometimes their setting at time 
t depends on the outcome of the tender at time t-1. Despite we look at data cross-sectionally, some 
endogeneity may be still present. 
24 These include participation requirements, antitrust regulation for joint bidding, contractor’s payment 
rules, etc..   21 
[dependent variablei] = constant + bk [independent variableik] + ei 
 
and k = 1, … K indexes all our explanatory variables, while i = 1, … N indexes our 
observation units. A cross-section estimate is carried out on 132 observations-bids. We 
estimate equations using standard OLS. 
The analysis of bidding behavior is split in 3 main parts. In the first we test for the 
existence of a relationship between price and quality in submitted bids. We do this 
running two regressions on quality (technical bids) and price separately, controlling for 
some other variable incorporating key aspects of the tender design and the bidding 
behavior. Note that regressing quality on price is not exactly the same that regressing 
price on quality. For instance, technical bids might be less sensitive to the reserve price 
than  price  bids.  But  price  bids  (and  scores)  are  completely  independent  of  the 
composition of the evaluating committees, that on the contrary can impact technical 
scores. 
In  the  second  part  we  address  the  issue  of  what  are  the  main  determinants  of  the 
price/quality ratio offered by suppliers. In the third one we investigate the determinants 
of the dispersion of technical scores in relation with the composition of the evaluating 
committee. 
List of variables included in regressions:  
Number  of  bids.  The number  of  bids  is  a  proxy  of  the  level  of  ex-ante  expected 
participation/competition to the tender. In mature markets, as IT market is, bidding 
suppliers  are  likely  to  know  each  other.  This  variable  can  therefore  provide 
information about what suppliers know about the level of competition in the tender. 
In  general,  this  variable  can  be  an  important  determinant  explaining  bidding 
behavior. Standard theory suggests that in a setting of independent private value 
model, prices increase with participation (in procurement, the price decreases with 
participation). 
Scoring rules. This is a binary variable, 1 for independent and 0 for interdependent 
scoring rules, respectively. Our conjecture is that independent scoring rules should 
stimulate competition on the economic side, since suppliers are able to compute ex-
ante the incremental score associated to additional price reductions. Predictability 
of the score may provide suppliers with incentives to bid more aggressively on 
price.  Interdependent  scoring,  instead,  complicates  bidding  and  the  conjectures 
suppliers  make  about  other  competitors’  bidding  behavior.  In  “average  scoring   22 
rules”, for instance, suppliers should be induced to estimate the average price in 
order to bid as close as possible to that level. This “game of expectations” may 
push submitted prices around the (estimated) average level rather than the lowest 
possible  level,  and  makes  price  distribution  more  concentrated  towards  higher 
prices. 
Experience. This is measured by the number of previously won contracts for any bid i 
at  any  given  time  t.  We  expect  more  experienced  suppliers  to  better  know  the 
procurement environment and thus ceteris paribus to offer proposals that better fit 
the various needs of the buyer. Expert suppliers are expected to be better informed 
about  the  real  needs  of  the  buyer  and  how  to  put  this  knowledge  into  more 
comprehensive  technical  offers.  This  should  yield  higher  technical  scores  with 
respect to less (or non-) experienced suppliers. 
Committees. This is a binary variable, equal to 1 for insiders committees and 0 for 
mixed committees (insiders + outsiders). This is a control variable capturing the 
fraction of technical score variability due to a different evaluation approach of the 
two types of committee. 
Bids and scores. We use technical score as a proxy of the ex-ante quality offered by 
suppliers. Rebates, financial scores and the price/reserve price ratios are alternative 
measures of economic effort. 
The number of explanatory variables is kept low. Such parsimony is used to focus 
more on those factors that are more likely to explain the dependent variable and, more 
important,  to  avoid  losing  degrees  of  freedom  given  the  not  very  large  number  of 
observations. 
Table 5 – Summary Statistics of variables 
Variable  Mean  St. Deviation  Min  Max  Obs 
N. of Bids  7.56  2.63  3  12  132 
Experience  1.73  2.29  0  10  136 
Tech. Score (relative)  66.17  14.72  29.17  96.82  132 
Financial Score (relative)  72.60  25.53  0  100  132 
Rebates  33.15  13.78  0.37  59.97  132 
Reserve Price  2.14e+07  1.88e+07  490,634  7.03e+07  20 
 
5.1 Testing for price/quality trade-off 
5.1.1. Technical score regression 
In  this  section  we  investigate  the  main  aspects  affecting  bidding  on  quality.  In 
particular, we investigate whether quality is explained by price, controlling for the type   23 
of  scoring  rule,  the  number  of  bidders,  the  type  of  committee  and  the  bidders’ 
experience. The type of scoring rule represents one key element of the tender design. 
Expected  participation/competition  and  experience  are  important  factors  potentially 
affecting bidding behavior. We measure quality with the technical score the suppliers 
are  assigned  by  the  committee  at  the  end  of  the  evaluation  process.  Quality  we 
consider is of the ex-ante type, i.e., what the suppliers commit to provide in terms of 
organization, quality standards and technological solutions. The equation we estimate 




Does  price  explain  ex-ante  quality?  We  performed  5  regressions  with  alternative 
measures of the price bid: financial score, rebate and relative price (price bid/reserve 
price). All regressions suggest that price explains quality, all the coefficients being 
statistically  significant.  However,  the  relationship  between  ex-ante  quality  and 
economical aspects is positive: higher quality is associated to lower prices and vice 
versa. The sign in this relation seems to contradict the paradigm of a “price-quality 
trade-off” in submitted bids. Nevertheless, this could be not so surprising, because of 
some arguments already mentioned above. One first explanation is that it is hard for 
the buyer to incorporate complex price/quality preferences in the tender design. If the 
awarding mechanism (the scoring rule) does not adequately reflect these preferences, 
price and quality may clearly exhibit perverse relationships as the ones observed in the 
data. 
 
Tech_Scorei = const +b1 Financial_Scorei [Rebate i; Bid_Price/Res_Price i] 
+b2 ∑t Winningit +b3 N_Bidsi +b4 Scoring_Rulei +b5 Committee_dummyi +ei         (5.1)   24 
 
The  results  might  also  be  driven  by  non-contractible  quality  considerations.  Since 
many quality dimensions are hard/costly to monitor ex-post, suppliers may anticipate 
this at the bidding stage and offer low prices for the “promise” of outstanding quality 
(yielding high technical scores), but lower ex-post effective quality.
26 A similar effect 
is studied in theory by Kim (1998), who builds up a procurement model where the 
buyer wishes to acquire a high-quality project by the use of a sealed-bid tendering. 
Non-contractible quality of projects implies transaction costs for contract enforcement 
and  difficulties  to  ensure  that  the  project  is  of  the  desired  high  quality.  In  this 
framework the author points out that if the buyer commits himself to a firm fixed price 
contract,




                                                 
25 Tests indicate that the estimated model is not affected by multi-collinearity for independent variables. 
F-test indicate that all variables should be included in the regression. Goodness of estimation appears 
good: despite parsimony the model is able to explain up 30%-35% of total variance. Further testing 
rejects the hypothesis of non-normality in estimated residuals, therefore supporting the choice of a linear 
model for our data. These considerations hold also for the price regressions. 
26 This is the case of the procurement environment we considered. Monitoring is difficult being quality 
widely non-contractible. Moreover, several public procurement legislations (among these we include 
Italian procurement laws), provide for limits to the use of customer satisfaction or other subjective 
measures of performance to judge contractors’ performance. In this context, it is rather difficult for 
public procurers to achieve a full contract enforcement but also to use effective reputational forces. In 
our dataset therefore we cannot control for the ex-post quality. 
27 Instead of re-tendering in case of undesired outcome. 
28  Also  note  that  project  complexity  can  make  the  estimation  of  the  organizational  efforts  actually 
required (and thus their monetary cost) a very hard task for the suppliers. This affects their ability to 
appropriately trade-off price and quality and may produce “optimistically” too low estimates of the 
project’s costs. 
Table 6 – Technical proposals Regression
25 
                                 OLS                                . 
Tech_Scorei  I.  II.  III.  IV.  V. 
Financial_Scorei  0.156*** 
(3.24)  -  -  -  - 





(2.44)  - 
Bid_Price/Res_Pricei  -  -  -  -  -38.91*** 
(-3.72) 










N_Bidsi  -1.41*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.854** 









(-4.14)  -  -9.625*** 
(-3.49) 




















           
Adj. R
2  0.33  0.35  0.33  0.29  0.35 
F-test  14.09  15.06  17.46  14.51  15.06 
N. Obs.  132  132  132  132  132 
t-Statistic shown in parentheses; significant levels at *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01.    25 
The role of other variables 
1) Estimates suggest that independent scoring (linear and concave)
29 reduces technical 
score increases (the sign of coefficients is always negative as reported in Table 6). 
Independent rules allow each supplier to determine his financial score unloosed from 
his competitors’ behaviour. This provide him with a clear incentive to improve the 
price offer. It is worth noting, on the contrary, that interdependent rules (lowest bid and 
average  scoring)  introduce  uncertainty  also  on  the  price  side.  Scores  become 
unpredictable because of the simultaneous presence of both discretional evaluation of 
technical proposals and interdependent price scoring. In this context, incentives for the 
suppliers to shift effort from quality towards price improvements are expected to be 




2) The variable ∑t Winningit summarizes the number of past contracts awarded to each 
bidding  supplier.  Experience/learning  is  what  the  supplier  has  learnt  during  the 
contract execution period. Learning can be important in complex procurement like the 
ones we are considering. Experience improves the supplier’s understanding of what are 
today (and could be in the future) the technological evolutions and the developments 
most fitting buyer’s needs, as well as the most important/critical activities among the 
ones indicated in the contract. In other words, the contractor learns to make a “custom 
tailored suite” and how to exploit this (private) information in subsequent procurement 
tenders. 
Any single observation, i.e., any single pair of price-quality bid, is associated to a 
measure of experience given by the number of contracts previously awarded to the 
supplier. Technical scores appear to be positively and significantly correlated with this 
variable.  Covariates  statistical  significance  is  robust  to  alternative  regressions 
specifications,  with  estimated  coefficients  maintaining  stability.  Winning  one 
                                                 
29 Concave scoring is such that the score increases less than proportionally as price declines. A standard 
concave scoring can be as follows: Si = [1 – (Pi/Pb)
a ] *PE. Where Si is the score obtained by bidder “i”,  
Pi  is the price submitted by bidder “i”, Pb is the reserve price, a  measures the slope of the curve and PE 
is the weight of price in the tender. Concave scoring clearly discourages bidders to bid aggressively, as 
soon as the incremental score is made negligible (depending on a) for marginal reductions of Pi. This 
rule is sometimes used in procurements where quality plays a significant role and the procurer wishes to 
avoid that very low price favours ex-post opportunism from the contractor. 
30  With  independent  scoring  rules  such  a  shift  can  indeed  pay:  rather  than  offering  X  additional 
consultants at a cost of say €250.000, to get an uncertain incremental technical score, the supplier can 
easily compute the (certain!) incremental score associated to a price reduction of the same amount.   26 
additional  contract  allows  the  supplier  to  improve  the  relative  technical  score  by 
roughly 3.1-3.6 points, about 6% of relative technical score on average. 
 
3)  The  number  of  bids  submitted  has  a  negative  impact  on  the  technical  score  
suggesting that the larger the number of bidders the lower the “promised” quality. A 
first possible explanation is that more participation shifts the players’ efforts towards 
price-competition rather than technical-competition. Again, the expectation that quality 
improvements  may  not  be  appropriately  rewarded  (or  will  do  less  than  price 
improvements)  may  induce  suppliers  to  shift  effort  from  quality  to  price  when 
expecting higher participation. 
Scoring rule and expected participation appear to interact, and to operate in the same 
direction.  In  point  sub  1)  we  have  seen  how  independent  scoring  rules  encourage 
competitors to shift effort toward price. Here we have found that higher participation 
in general encourages them to shift effort toward price competition. 
 
4) Despite statistical significance is achieved only when using the financial score as 
covariate,  the  composition  of  committees  seems  to  affect  technical  scores  in  the 
conjectured direction. Internal commissions are associated to a lower average technical 
score. Insiders tend to discriminate quality proposals more than outsiders, providing 
support  for  the  results  of  the  analysis  of  technical  score  distributions  presented  in 
section 6. 
 
5.1.2. The determinants of price bids 
Symmetrically to the previous regressions, we test whether price bids are explained by 
quality, controlling for other variables. We also control for the contract value (reserve 
price) since this may effect more directly price bids, in particular the magnitude of 
rebates.  We  measure  price  bid  with  the  %  of  rebate.  Price  bid  regression  is  also 
performed as a “check” for results obtained in technical regressions. 




Rebate i [Financial_Scorei] = const +b1 Tech_Scorei + 
+b2 Scoring_Rulei +b3 ∑t Winningit +b4 N_Bidsi +b5 Reserve_Pricei +ei 
(5.2) 
   27 
Table 7 – Financial proposals Regression 
  Tech_ 
Scorei 
Scoring_ 
Rulei  ∑t Winningit  N_Bidsi  Reserve_ 
Pricei 
Constant 
term  Adj. R
2  F-test  N. Obs 
Rebatei.











(-0.73)  0.42  19.97  132 
Rebatei.











(-0.21)  0.53  31.04  132 
t-Statistic shown in parentheses; significant levels at *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01. 
(E) Heteroscedastic affliction; (1) weight: Reserve_Price; 
 
As expected, price and quality are still positively correlated. Estimated coefficients 
also show that:  
i)  experience reduces rebates, i.e., increases prices; 
ii)  higher expected competition lowers the price (increases rebate). This point 
is  worth  stressing.  The  level  of  expected  competition  does  not  impact 
quality  as  it  does  for  price,  although  the  directions  of  effects  are 
unequivocal on both quality and price bid, as shown until now. If the ex-
ante quality goes down, the opportunistic decision of decreasing price bid 
may  be  the  relative  cause  in  so  far  as  either  effects  are  in  response  of 
expected  competition.  But  we  demonstrate  below  that  this  first  clue  of 
price-quality  trade-off  is  not  confirmed  because  of  the  ex-ante  quality 
unstable sensitivity to expected competition (see results in table 8). This 
indirectly  supports  the  idea  that  quality  and  price  bidding  may  be  set 
independently rather than in a (very) coordinated manner by the supplier. 
Quality  appears  to  respond  more  to  factors  related  to  the  suppliers’ 
experience. Price, instead, reflects information on expected competition and 
the nature of the scoring rule. 
iii)  the  reserve  price  seems  to  play  no  role  in  the  regression  as  a  control 
variable for the dimension of the contract. 
iv)  Notice that independent scoring rules induce to lower prices (higher rebate). 
This suggests again that simplicity of the rule and predictability of the score 
make suppliers’ life easier when bidding on price and induce them to bid 
more  aggressively.  Independent  scoring  affects  financial  proposals  by 
decreasing submitted relative prices (increasing rebates) by 16%-21% on 
average. 
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6. The determinants of price/quality ratio 
 
In  this  section  we  look  at  bidding  behaviour  under  a  different  perspective.  We 
investigate the main elements driving the submitted price/quality ratios. We identify 
the main determinants of price/quality ratio by using a price/quality index.
31 The index 
may be interpreted as a measure of the elasticity of the price with respect to quality. 










The index displays the following properties.  
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where  subscripts  “c”  and  “i”  identify  contracts  and  bidders,  respectively.  As  a 
consequence, it will also be: 
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The price/quality ratio improves when the index decreases. When the price declines, 
Price_bid/Reserve_price declines (the rebate increases). This in turn lowers the index, 
i.e., improves the price/quality index. At the same time, as the technical score increases 
the  denominator  also  increases;  this  pushes  the  ratio  down,  again  improving  the 
                                                 
31 This is the natural way to measure a price/quality ratio. Alternatively, we could have considered the 
total score (sum of technical and price scores). However, this indicator would suffer from the fact that 
the effects on price and quality are milked and made indiscernible. 
32 Where the reserve price and the upper bound of technical scores are indexed for c = 1…C, the number 
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price/quality index. Therefore, higher quality and lower prices are associated to  i
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closer to 0.








Tab. 8 – Price/Quality Index Regression 
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Adj. R
2  0.19  0.24  0.33  0.53  0.26  0.13  0.26 
F-test  8.50  11.59  17.28  37.93  12.29  5.93  12.77 
N. Obs.  132  132  132  132  132  132  132 
t-Statistic shown in parentheses; significant levels at *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01. 
(E) Heteroscedastic affliction; (1) weight: Reserve_Price; (2) weight: N_Bids 
 
The first two columns report the results of standard estimation with OLS and robust 
regressions  (WLS).  Weighted  Least  Squares  regression  is  used  to  deal  with 
heteroscedasticity.
34 The remaining columns instead report the estimations considering 
either the numerator or the denominator, again controlling for heteroscedasticity. 
                                                 
33 Notice that when the submitted price is equal to the reserve price (zero rebate) and the actual technical 
score equals the maximum, 
1
i
p R Q =
, however, this cannot be considered the worst price/quality ratio. 
In other words, the index is not defined for extreme values. This also occurs when technical score is 
closer to zero and thus the index explodes to infinity although price approaches zero. However, we have 
not extreme cases in our dataset. 
34  Tests  identify  the  variable(s)  source  of  the  heteroscedasticity.  We  use  these  variables  to  weight 
observation when running WLS regressions. In the second and last column of Table 8, regressions are 
weighted for the reserve price and number of bids according to the results of the test.   30 
Estimates indicate that both scoring rule and past experience play an important role in 
explaining the price/quality ratios. Negative correlations implies overall improvements 
in  the  price/quality  index.  Scoring  rules  and  experience  clearly  go  towards  this 
direction, confirming the effects showed in previous regressions. Independent scoring 
positively impacts the price/quality ratio achieved by the buyer: about 25%-31% of 
improvement in the index (made base for computation the mean value of the index)
35 
is  associated  with  the  use  of  independent  scoring  rules  instead  of  interdependent 
scoring rules. However, the largest impact occurs on the economic side of competition 
(the  numerator  of  the  index  captures  the  effect  on  price  side).  This  is  shown  by 
regressions 3 and 4. 
Table 8 reports regressions 5-7 that capture the impact on quality side of competition 
(denominator  of  the  index).  Experience  is  quite  relevant.  One  additional  contract 
awarded improves the price/quality index by 3.4%-8.2%, if referring to its mean value. 
Decomposing  the  estimation,  bidder  experience  has  still  the  strongest  impact  on 
quality as found in the previous regressions (5 to 7). Reserve price variable here is 
used as a control variable, in order to account for the variability of the contract value. 
In  the  second  column  the  reserve  price  is  used  as  instrument  to  control  for 
heteroscedasticity. 
Finally, notice again the role of expected level of competition (number of submitted 
bids). Signs and significance of coefficients confirm the reasoning proposed in section 
5.1.2, point ii). Technical proposals (the denominator of the index) are not influenced 
by the number of expected bidders (coefficient is not significant), while price does. So, 
the price/quality ratio doesn’t show a clear overall improvement when competition gets 
fiercer, despite a competition effect is well-rendered on price bids. 
 
 
7. Evaluating committees 
 
Evaluation  of  quality  proposals  may  vary  significantly,  depending  on  how  deeply 
people  involved  in  the  evaluation  process  know  the  procurement  environment,  the 
needs of the buyer and the various details of the contract. Insiders, i.e., Consip IT 
experts,  know  these  things  much  better  than  any  outsider  expert.  Filling  this 
                                                 
35 The mean value of price/quality ratio, as computed on the 132 observations of dataset, amounts to 
1.05 (min: 0.55, max: 2.78) and variance to 0.15.   31 
information gap can be very costly and time consuming for outsiders. Outsiders in the 
committee  were  provided  for,  by  law,  to  increase  transparency  in  the 
awarding/evaluation procedures. However, such a transparency may not be costless. 
Lack  of  familiarity  with  the  specific  procurement  context  may  limit  the  ability  of 
committees to correctly distinguish among proposals with respect to insiders. A lower 
dispersion  in  technical  scores,  and  higher  average  technical  scores  may  could  be 
interpreted as the fear of outsiders components of the committees for potential appeals 
of suppliers. On their part, day-to-day direct work on projects put insiders in a better 
position  to  fully  understand  the  procurement  tender  context  and  to  better  evaluate 
quality proposals. This also enables insiders to better defend their choices in case of 
dispute with suppliers. 
These conjectures seem to find some support in the data. Table 9 summarizes some 
simple statistics on technical scores distinguishing between insiders (committee = 1) 
and mixed (insiders + outsiders) committee (committee = 0). Two things are worth 
noting: 
1)  The variability of technical scores with all-insider committees is greater than with 
mixed committees. Mean variance is 0.083 vs. 0.058, i.e., 43% greater than in mixed 
committees. Mean standard deviation is 0.136 vs. 0.11, 23% greater than in mixed 
committees. Dispersion of technical scores is clearly higher with insider committees. 
Regression analysis reported in table 9.2 shows that such differences are statistically 
more significant, if a zero-intercept regression is run.
36 
2)  Mixed committees are also more generous in rewarding quality with respect to 
insiders. Mean technical score is 68.63 and 62.55, respectively, 10% higher with mixed 
commissions. The maximum score is 96.82 of outsiders and 93.33 from insiders. 
 
 
Tab. 9.1 – Summary Statistic on Committee 
Statistics  Committee = 0  Committee = 1 
Mean of Technical Score St. Deviation  0.11  0.136 
Mean of Technical Score Variance  0.058  0.083 
Observations (by group)  79  56 
Mean of Technical Score  68.63  62.55 
St. Deviation (by group)  13.88  15.15 
Minimum  29.17  32.29 
Maximum   96.82  93.33 
 
 
                                                 
36 Imposing the model with a zero-intercept should be reasonable. When number of valid bids is zero 
(no participant) there is no reason because dispersion of financial score is different from zero, the same 
is for dispersion in technical score.    32 
Table 9.2 – Evaluation Committees Regression
37 
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Constant term  0.021 
(0.63)  -  0.003 
(0.10)  - 
         
Adj. R
2  0.31  0.92  0.15  0.77 
F-test  3.85  78.53  2.14  23.18 
N. Obs.  20  20  20  20 
t-Statistic shown in parentheses; significant levels at *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01. 
 
 
8. Conclusions  
 
In this paper we explored the determinants of suppliers’ bidding behaviour, using a 
unique dataset of contracts for IT services that Consip awarded on behalf of the Italian 
Ministry of Economy and Finance. 
One first finding is the absence of a tension between price and quality in observed 
bids. Price and quality appear inversely related: higher quality is associated to lower 
prices.  This  results  may  be  due  to  the  difficulty  for  the  buyer  to  adequately 
describe/incorporate her price/quality preferences into the tender design (the scoring 
rule). Consistently with Kim (1998), also non-contractible quality considerations might 
play a role, as these can shape the suppliers’ incentives towards submitting low prices 
for ex-post lower-than-promised quality. 
Another finding is that the nature of the scoring rule and past experience appear to be 
among the most important determinants of submitted price/quality ratios. Experience 
plays a primary role in bidding, positively affecting the level of ex-ante quality and in 
general price/quality ratios. Superior information on the procurement environment can 
significantly increase the contractor’s probabilities to award future contracts. 
Independent  scoring  rules  facilitate  bidding  and  encourage  suppliers  to  be  more 
aggressive on the price side of the tender. This suggests that interdependent scoring 
                                                 
37 Explanatory variables are indexed to t = 1…20, where t is the contract number. In this field the 
observations available are only 20, such that the number of all treated contracts we analyze. In our 
estimations we use the dispersion measures of financial scores simply as a control variable. The number 
of bidders by lot (contract) is useful in order to control for tender participation that may affect the 
expectation of each bidder on quality proposals  from competitors, and  so the actual  distribution of 
technical proposals.   33 
rules are only an obstacle to bidding in already complex procurement environments. 
The  result  has  some  connections  with  Lundberg  (2005),  who  shows  how  bidding 
strategies are complicated when the buyer’s trade-off between price and quality is not 
announced to bidders. Interdependent scoring rules make in fact buyers’ preferences 
rather opaque. 
Finally, we find that the distribution of scores for technical proposals is significantly 
less dispersed when evaluation committees are composed of “outsiders” (mainly non-
IT-Consip  experts)  rather  than  “insiders”,  suggesting  that  in  the  former  case 
competition is shifted more towards price. Also, outsiders tend to be more generous 
than insiders. Risk aversion for appeals may explain this pattern. 
 
Results allow us to give some indications for IT services tender designers: 
1.  Price and quality. Since scoring auctions may not well incorporate buyer’s 
price/quality preferences, other mechanisms such as negotiations or restricted 
procedures, could be preferable to award complex IT projects. 
2.   Scoring rules. Independent scoring rules tend to improve the price/quality ratio 
of the buyer with respect to interdependent scoring rules. Improvements are 
mainly driven by price reductions, and are likely to be due to the simplicity of 
the  rule  and  predictability  of  the  score.  This  suggests  to  use  independent 
scoring, such as a linear scoring rules. This finding seem to go in the direction 
indicated in a seminal paper by Che (1993) who shows that when the buyer has 
commitment power over, a scoring rule that is linear can implement the optimal 
scheme. 
 
3.   Committees. We have shown a potential trade-off between transparency and 
  the  effectiveness  of  bid  evaluation  process.  With  all-insider  committee  the 
  awarding process might appear less transparent to the market. However, with 
  respect  to  non-fully  insiders,  fully  insider  committees  are  more  likely  to 
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